Information Warfare

The Evolution of Information Warfare in Ukraine: 2014 to 2022

Abstract:

In January 2022, Russian forces began building up on the Ukrainian border prior to entering Ukraine in what was termed a ‘special military operation’ in support of ethnic Russians. In the ten months of conflict, there has been a range of information warfare tactics deployed, most notably disinformation and cyber operations. Ukraine is a particularly useful case study due to the ongoing tensions and low-intensity conflict, since the social media-led uprisings and annexation of Crimea in 2014. This article conducts an analysis of the information warfare in the Russo-Ukraine conflict, and contrasts this to prior operations to illustrate the evolution, limitations, and possible future of information warfare during a kinetic conflict.

Published In

Volume 22, Issue 1

Written By

Brett van Niekerk

Russia’s Misinformation Campaign during Wartime: The Threat to Deploy Nuclear Weapons against Ukraine and Her Allies

Abstract:

Russia has historically employed deception, misinformation/disinformation, propaganda, active measures, and information operations to dissuade and limit state actors from pursuing courses of actions that challenge the Kremlin’s political and military objectives. Misinformation is non-kinetic and both informs and assists Russia’s military strategy. Communication platforms with global reach spread state-sponsored misinformation to influence, shape, and limit Western political and military responses against Russia’s war in Ukraine. That Kremlin’s stated willingness to deploy tactical and strategic nuclear weapons against Ukraine and the West follows narratives that generate doubt and uncertainty regarding the true intentions of Russian state behaviour.

Published In

Volume 22, Issue 1

Written By

Gavin Briggs

Information Warfare and Critical Infrastructure: The Combined Power of Information Warfare Threats

Abstract:

Critical Infrastructure (CI) is an area that has historically been rife with vulnerabilities, open to foreign and domestic threats. Recent events such as the Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods provider ransomware attacks highlight the need for better security and resiliency from cyber threats. However, within the Information Warfare (IW) constructs that have become increasingly refined by peer adversaries like China and Russia, the areas of Electromagnetic Warfare (EW), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Information Operations (IO) have become equally important to consider in the panoply of IW. This raises the important question regarding whether CI assets are adequately protected from the full complement of IW threats. Each IW area will be discussed from a threat perspective and examples will be presented to show how these threats can be combined to disrupt, deny, and destroy CI and CI assets with special attention given to peer and non-peer adversaries and the asymmetric advantages of each.

Published In

Volume 21, Issue 4

Written By

Joshua Alton Sipper

Information Influence Operations: Application of National Instruments of Power

Abstract:

National Instruments of power are means for a nation to exert influence on other nations to achieve certain ends. This paper examines how Ukraine used its national instruments of power during the first months of the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 to conduct information influence operations. First, information influencing as a concept is described and then the framework of the paper is constructed by describing instruments of power and the basic elements of a strategy. This framework is then used to analyse how Ukraine used its instruments of power. Finally, this paper sums up the results with discussion and conclusions.

Published In

Volume 21, Issue 4

Future of Information Influence Operations: Scifi as a Tool to Imagine the Unthinkable

Abstract:

The importance of information influence operations in international conflicts has increased. New technologies and tools like the Internet and social media have enabled influence operations to shift to new channels with a wider audience. But what will happen to information influence operations in the future? By using future studies’ methods like scenarios and science fiction, it is possible to try to imagine the various possibilities for information influence operations. This article presents a method for creating scifi stories based on scenarios to think about the future of information influence operations and their counteractions.

Published In

Volume 21, Issue 4

PSYOP, CYBER, and Internet Influence: Firing Digital Bullets

Abstract:

With the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, social media, and their continued exponential growth across society, it is necessary to comprehensively understand these platforms to engage threat networks at home and abroad. Undergirding all web-based actions, however, is human behaviour. Therefore, understanding human behaviour and the dynamic range of characteristics, actions, and attributes that are influenced by culture and context, for web-based offensive and defensive actions, is an ever-evolving niche skill. As such, non-kinetic activities and change efforts, especially in the cyber domain, require cross-cultural competence and experience in addition to any cyber capability.

Published In

Volume 21, Issue 2

My Unusual, Unexpected, and Unpredictable IW Journey, 1988-2021: A Memoir & Observations on the Future of IW Education

Abstract:

Up until 1981 I was a professional recording engineer and producer. By pure happenstance, in 1983 I was introduced to encryption while consulting to Western Digital. That work led me to a quite unconventional career shift that put me, an audio engineer, in the middle of international intriques surrounding the early days of information warfare. This is my story.

Published In

Volume 20, Issue 4

Written By

Winn Schwartau

Modelling Information Warfare: Visualising Definitions, Fundamental Characteristics, and Foundational Theories of Contemporary Information Warfare

Abstract:

Increasingly, the term ‘Information Warfare’ (IW) encompasses the full gamut of techniques whereby information is employed to gain a competitive advantage in conflict or strategic competition. Research reveals commonalities in the underlying rationale, strategies, and means of historical and contemporary IW despite the evolution of the scale and scope of it. 

Published In

Volume 20, Issue 3

Written By

Pat Blannin

Evolution of Australia’s Cyber Warfare Strategy

Abstract: 

Since 2000, Australia has re-positioned itself from a country having scant recognition of cyber warfare to a nation with limited offensive and defensive capability facing increasing cyber incidents from at least one state-based actor (informally attributed as China). The dominance of a continental defence culture hindered the early development of a robust cyber warfare capability, resulting in a limited focus towards national infrastructure security. 

Published In

Volume 20, Issue 1

Written By

Andrew Williams

The Taliban’s Information War: The Tactical Use of Frames

Abstract:

The Taliban are engaged in strategic information warfare on multiple fronts. This study examines how the Taliban use frames to transmit ideology for Information Operations. Frames are used tactically in information warfare because they are designed to generate responses via emotionally laden communication defined as propaganda. This study is unique because it analyses data derived from digital domains and from physical sources in Kabul. A Taliban Communication Typology has been culled from the 66 individual Taliban frames identified in this research. Analysis, via ontological coding, indicates that the Taliban communicate along five core messages that are framed to outline problems and solutions.

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 4

A General Theory of Influence in a DIME/PMESII/ASCOP/IRC2 Model

Abstract:

The leading question of this paper is “How can one conceptualise influence warfare in order to simulate it?” The authors discuss the foundational aspects of theory and model of influence warfare by building a conceptual framework. The framework forms a prism with three axes along the DIME/PMESII/ASCOP dimensions. The DIME concept groups the many instru-ments of power a nation-state can muster into four elements: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics. PMESII describes the operational environment in six domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure. ASCOPE is used in COunterINsurgency (COIN) environments to analyse the cultural and human environment (the ‘human terrain’) and encompasses Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People, and Events.

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 2

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part I

Abstract:

The following three articles examine three causal mechanisms prompting U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from conventional warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW): (1) the expansion of the information environment; (2) the globalisation, diffusion, and weaponisation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs); and (3) their acknowledgment that NCW provides a broader menu of indirect approaches not previously afforded through traditional CW. It cautions U.S. decision makers to recognise this shift and to counter it by establishing an interagency Information Warfare Directorate in the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC IWD should draft practical policies that result in the integration of the various aspects of domestic and foreign departments and agencies to cross-coordinate NCW activities. This will require remediating national policy and authority gaps as well as addressing any shortcomings in the budget allocation process.

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 2

Written By

Peter Wilcox

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part II

Abstract: 

This article expands upon the previous article by examining the efficacy of Conventional Warfare (CW in a Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW environment. In particular, it attempts to characterise the relationship between globalisation and diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, in relation to its antifragility in NCW settings. More broadly, it argues that in an information-rich environment, characterised by advanced ICTs, adversaries now have the means to circumvent CW superiority and to influence policy asymmetrically. This article concludes that ICTs may align more appropriately with an NCW paradigm rather than the ostensible CW paradigm embraced by the West.

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 2

Written By

Peter Wilcox

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part III

Abstract:

This concluding article briefly returns to the key themes identified in the first two articles in relation to the three causal mechanisms that prompted U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from Conventional Warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW). The article argues that by attaching an overt degree of salience to the integration of ICT in CW, analysts have overlooked its potential in NCW. 

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 2

Written By

Peter Wilcox

A Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix for Outsmarting Your Adversaries

Abstract:

While Cyber CounterIntelligence (CCI) has been a distinctive specialisation field for state security structures internationally for well over a decade, recently there has been growing recognition of CCI’s significance to non-state actors. CCI is central to proactively mitigating cyber risk and exploiting opportunities. With the growing recognition of CCI’s significance comes an appreciation of its complexity. CCI is all about outthinking and outwitting adversaries. This article advances a conceptual matrix that can serve both as a high-level ‘pocket guide’ for outsmarting adversaries and as an aid to academic research.

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 1

Cyber Sanctions: Weaponising the Embargo of Flagged Data in a Fragmented Internet

Abstract:

This paper introduces the concept of cyber sanctions, which can be defined as the actual or threatened restriction of digital transactions to affect a behavioural change by the target through the introduction of psychological pressure against its political leaders and populace. While the concept of ‘internet sovereignty’ deals with the country’s choice to control foreign data from coming in or ‘sovereign’ data from going out (self-imposed digital isolation), cyber sanctions deal with senders (powerul states or entities imposing the sanctions) restricting certain ‘flagged’ data from traveling to or from the target (forced digital isolation).

Published In

Volume 19, Issue 1

Written By

Ion Iftimie

Understanding and Assessing Information Influence and Foreign Interference

Abstract: 

The information influence framework was developed to identify and to assess hostile, strategy-driven, state-sponsored information activities. This research proposes and tests an analytical approach and assessment tool called information influence and interference to measure changes in the level of strategy-driven, state-sponsored information activities by the timeliness, specificity, and targeted nature of communications as well as the dissemination tactics of publicly available information. 

Published In

Volume 18, Issue 1

Written By

Miah Hammond-Errey

Testing the Importance of Information Control: How Does Russia React When Pressured in the Information Environment?

Abstract:

Applying big data and sentiment analysis to TASS reporting and 15 years of Russian Foreign Ministry documents, this paper tests the importance Moscow places on information control. By comparing the Russian government’s responses to four categories of foreign policy tools— diplomatic, information, military, and economic (the DIME construct)—this research finds that Russia reacts far more negatively to information tools than to military, diplomatic, or economic tools. 

Published In

Volume 18, Issue 1

Written By

Scott Fisher

Israeli Defense Forces’ Information Operations 2006-2014 Part 1

Abstract:

This article series examines the evolution of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Information Op- eration (IO) activities during an eight-year timespan from 2006 to 2014. The case study shows a change in the Israeli Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series describes the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009. 

Published In

Volume 18, Issue 1

Written By

Teemu Saressalo

Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operations 2006-2014 Part 2

Abstract:

This article series examines the evolution of the Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operation activities during an eight-year timespan, from 2006 to 2014. To this end, the case study shows a change in the Israel Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series described the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009.

Published In

Volume 18, Issue 1

Written By

Teemu Saressalo

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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