Misinformation

Information Warfare: Leveraging the DMMI Matrix Cube for Risk Assessment

Abstract:

This paper presents the DMMI Matrix Cube and demonstrates its use in assessing risk in the context of information warfare. By delineating and ordinating the concepts of disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and information, its purpose is to gauge a communication’s intention to cause harm, and its likelihood of success; these, together, define the severity of weaponised information, such as those employed within sophisticated information operations. The chance or probability of the (information) risk is determined by the intention to harm, the apparent veracity of the information, and the probability of its occurrence. As an exemplar, COVID-19 anti-vaccine campaigns are mapped to the DMMI Matrix Cube, and recommendations are offered based on stakeholder needs, interests, and objectives.

Defining Influence across Online Social Media Platforms

Abstract:

The ubiquitous nature of social media has seen it become a conduit for the propagation of misinformation to a global audience. The unfettered nature of social media has served to delegitimize the online environment. This has been compounded through the use of social media by malicious actors for the conduct of influence operations at scale. Therefore, there is a need for a greater understanding of social media platforms within the context of Information Warfare. 

False Information as a Threat to Modern Society: A Systematic Review of False Information, Its Impact on Society, and Current Remedies

Abstract:

False information and by extension misinformation, disinformation and fake news are an ever-growing concern to modern democratic societies, which value the freedom of information alongside the right of the individual to express his or her opinions freely. This paper focuses on misinformation, with the aim to provide a collation of current research on the topic and a discussion of future research directions

Machine Intelligence to Detect, Characterise, and Defend against Influence Operations in the Information Environment

Abstract:

Deceptive content—misleading, falsified, and fabricated—is routinely created and spread online with the intent to create confusion and widen political and social divides. This study presents a comprehensive overview of content intelligence capabilities (WatchOwl– https://watchowl. pnnl.gov/) to detect, describe, and defend against information operations on Twitter as an example social platform to explain the influence of misleading content diffusion and enable those charged with defending against such manipulation and responsive parties to counter it. We first present deep learning models for misinformation and disinformation detection in multilingual and multimodal settings followed by psycho-linguistic analysis across broad deception categories. 

Influence Operations & International Law

Abstract: 

There is no treaty or specifically applicable customary international law that deals squarely with ‘Influence Operations’ (IO). Despite this, there are a number of discrete areas of international law that nonetheless apply indirectly to regulate this activity. These principally relate to the Use of Force (Jus ad Bellum), International Human Rights Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict. Influence Operations are presumptively lawful in each of these three areas provided that such activities do not cross relatively high thresholds of prohibition. In the event that an IO does cross a prohibition set by international law, there are a number of responses available to a targeted State.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Keywords

A

AI
APT

C

C2
C2S
CDX
CIA
CIP
CPS

D

DNS
DoD
DoS

I

IA
ICS

M

S

SOA

X

XRY

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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