Attribution

Extending the ‘Attribution Problem’: Why Who-Based Attribution Is Insufficient to Deterring Cyberattacks

Abstract:

Current scholarship explains the shortcomings of cyber deterrence through the difficulty involved in proving who launched an attack—what scholars refer to as the ‘attribution problem’. This paper identifies an additional intelligence-centric impediment to cyber deterrence. Cyberattacks yield effects in a manner that is indirect, while offensive cyber operations are multi-stage and multipurpose. 

Enabling the Development and Deployment of NATO Cyber Operations: An Analysis of Modern Cyber Warfare Operations and Thresholds of Global Conflict

Abstract:

This article presents an overview of cyberspace operational cognition within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper likens submarine warfare tactics used during the Cold War to current cyberspace tactics used in modern warfare. As the European Union moves toward a market governed by digital economies, the influx of cyber security technologies and nation-state support should match this influx to prevent, holistically, malicious compromise. 

South Korea’s Options in Responding to North Korean Cyberattacks

Abstract:

North Korea has increasingly mounted cyberattacks against South Korea. This paper first examines the dramatic differences between North and South Korea in cyberspace and the history of North Korean cyberattacks. Most of these attacks are easy to attribute for three reasons: they often come from addresses known to be used by North Korea; they often occur on Korean anniversaries; and they often use similar methods and attack code. In this article, the authors discuss possible responses by South Korea. Responses to these attacks begin with invoking  international  law  and  imposing  sanctions.  Next,  South  Korea  can  strengthen  its defences by improving coordination between the government and the private sector. Finally, South Korea could, justifiably, launch counterattacks.

War Crimes from Cyber-Weapons

ABSTRACT

As information warfare capabilities have grown in recent years, the possibilities of war crimes with cyber-attacks have increased.  The main ethical problems of cyber-weapons in regard to ruses, secrecy, and collateral damage are examined, and analogies drawn to biological weapons.  It argues that most cyber-attacks are instances of perfidy, and spread so easily that they can approach biological weapons in their uncontrollability.  Then mitigation techniques for cyber-weapons in the form of more precise targeting, reversibility, and self-attribution are considered.  The paper concludes with a survey of some methods for prosecution and punishment of cyber-war crimes including forensics, interventions, cyber-blockades, and reparations, and proposes a new kind of pacifism called 'cyber-pacifism'.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Keywords

A

AI
APT

C

C2
C2S
CDX
CIA
CIP
CPS

D

DNS
DoD
DoS

I

IA
ICS

M

P

PDA

S

SOA

X

XRY

Quill Logo

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

SUBSCRIBE NOW

Get in touch

Registered Agent and Mailing Address

  • Journal of Information Warfare
  •  ArmisteadTEC
  • Dr Leigh Armistead, President
  • 1624 Wakefield Drive
  • Virginia Beach, VA 23455

 757.510.4574

 JIW@ArmisteadTec.com