Building an Integrated Cyber Defence Capability for African Missions


Cyberspace has been designated by organizations such as NATO as the fifth domain for battlespace, and many nations are already having and/or building their capabilities in the cyber defence environment in order to protect and defend their assets against any onslaught by their adversaries. It is a common belief that many African countries are not well positioned or prepared to respond effectively to cyberattacks against their citizens, critical infrastructure, and government. In many instances, the gap can be traced to the shortage of skills, lack of cybersecurity readiness and preparedness, and lack of investment in cybersecurity programmes, including policies within the military’s strategic, tactical, and operational environments.

A Social Contract for Cyberspace


A social contract is about the rights and responsibilities among the members of the society on one hand and the state and government on the other. Cyberspace, by serving as a unique global platform for the connection and communication of its billions of users, creates its own social structure and thereby forms a new regulatory ecosystem. The societal reform that is facilitated by cyberspace challenges the traditional understanding of rights and responsibilities that shape social contract theory. The disinformation campaigns, the spread of hate speech, and the emergence of systemic algorithmic discrimination are examples that illustrate the need for new rules and social agreements between all stakeholders. 

A Basic Set of Mental Models for Understanding and Dealing with the CyberSecurity Challenges of Today


For most people, cybersecurity is a difficult notion to grasp. Traditionally, cybersecurity has been considered a technical challenge, and still many specialists understand it as information security, with the notions of confidentiality, integrity, and availability as its foundation. Although many have searched for different and broader perspectives, the complexity and ambiguity of the notion still thwarts a common understanding. While the author was developing and executing a MSc cybersecurity program for professionals with a wide variety of backgrounds and widely differing views on cybersecurity, the lack of a common understanding of cybersecurity was clearly evident. Based on these observations, the author began seeking and defining a new, transdisciplinary conceptualization of cybersecurity that can be widely agreed upon. It resulted in the publication of three scientific papers. This paper is an amalgam of the contents of the three supplemented with some extensions. It turned out that the previously introduced description of two key notions, cyberspace and cybersecurity, is still an adequate starting point. Described here is a set of additional mental models elaborating on these key notions and providing more detail on their meanings.

Exploring the Complexity of Cyberspace Governance: State Sovereignty, Multi-stakeholderism, and Power Politics


Cyberspace is a socio-political and technological domain with unique characteristics. Its decentralized nature and the fact that it is mostly owned and managed by the private sector raise a number of questions regarding the most effective model of governance. Viewing cyberspace as a global commons, balancing between state sovereignty and the fragmentation of cyberspace, and debating between multilateralism and multi-stakeholderism makes discussions of cyberspace governance quite complex. The cases of ITU, ICANN, IGF, UN GGE, and NETmundial raise issues of legitimacy and accountability and offer a pragmatic insight into the power politics of cyberspace

Applying Principles of Reflexive Control in Information and Cyber Operations


According to Russian methodologies, the theory of Reflexive Control (RC) allows an initiator to induce an adversary to take a decision advantageous to the initiator through information manipulation. The RC theory encompasses a methodology where specifically prepared information is conveyed to an adversary, which would lead that adversary to make a decision desired by the initiator. The methodology is generally understood by Russian planners to be applicable in a wide variety of situations, and is deeply rooted within Russian Information Warfare concepts. Because theory envelops the Russian understanding of information as both technical data and cognitive content, ‘information resources’ are understood as technological as well as human.

Cyberspace—Making Some Sense of It All


This paper provides a framework describing the characteristics and implications of cyberspace which the author defines as the meld of technology, people, and the procedures that bind the two. Taken in sum, these elements comprise a dynamic environment that hosts a global information repository of incalculable value and the means to inform and coordinate the actions of individuals, governments, critical infrastructure, and militaries.

The Role of the U.S. Military in Cyberspace


As the United States has grown dependent on cyberspace, the U.S. military has come to have an increasingly important role to play in protecting U.S. national interests in the cyber domain. In addition to operating and defending its own cyberspace resources and supporting other military missions, the U.S. military must now be prepared to defend the country as a whole. These missions require the military to innovate and to collaborate effectively with a whole host of international, governmental, and private sector actors.

Information War and Rethinking Phase 0


In the Department of Defense, both military and civilian planners use a framework that divides military operations into six distinct phases. This type of framework may no longer have the utility it once enjoyed. This shift has less to do with technology changing the nature of war and more to do with how the United States differs from its adversaries in its understanding of war. Adversaries of the U.S. understand the state of the world to be one of conflict and competition and look to strategy to impose order through hierarchy. This article considers the Russian and Chinese approaches to the use of information in war and makes recommendations on how the U.S. might respond.

Cyberspace Offense and Defense


As the newest domain of military operations, cyberspace presents new challenges and learning opportunities. The fundamental military concepts operations apply, but often in ways different from the other domains. This paper examines military concepts of offense and defense in the cyberspace domain. Much previous work attempts to map military concepts into cyberspace while avoiding the technological reality of the domain. This paper applies foundational principles from the established field of information security to make a more technologically grounded examination of cyberspace offense and defense, their relationship, and how their nature here differs from the other operational domains.

Qualifying the Information Sphere as a Domain


Neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor NATO has an official definition of a domain, nor a set of criteria for what constitutes a domain. The authors propose a definition of a domain, define what constitutes a domain, posit how new domains are created over time, and describe six features or criteria for how to qualify what is and is not a domain. These definitions lead to our proposal that the ‘Information Sphere’ (which includes cyberspace) qualifies as a new domain, with features both similar to and different from the four existing physical domains.

Using a layered model to place EW in context within the information sphere


In recent years, a discussion on the relationship between Electronic Warfare (EW), Information Warfare (IW), Cyber Operations, Net-Centric Warfare, Command and Control, Information Operations (IO) and other constructs have emerged. This paper proposes a three-layer model in an attempt to provide a new perspective on this discussion. Each layer is defined and the roles and relationships between EW, IW, and IO are explained accordingly. Using this approach is extremely powerful as it emphasises the complementary natures these fields should have, rather than the rivalry which is often the present. An attack on an 802.11g (WiFi) wireless link is used as an example to display the value this layered approach can offer.

Exercising State Sovereignty in Cyberspace: An International Cyber-Order under Construction?


Cyberspace is erroneously characterized as a domain that transcends physical space and thereby is immune to state sovereignty and resistant to international regulation.  The purpose of this paper is to signify that cyberspace, in common with the other four  domains (land, sea, air and outer space) and despite its unique characteristics, is just a reflection of the current international system and, thereby, is largely affected by the rules that characterize it. The issue of state sovereignty in cyberspace raises critical questions about the need to regulate the cyber domain and gradually reach an international cyber-order.

Retrospective Evaluation of Cyber-security Strategic Reports for the Next Two Decades: From 2000 to 2030


Retrospective taxonomical evaluation of the strategic cyber-security reports of the last decade is important to appreciate how the very concept of Cyberspace has evolved along with other important concepts and definitions such as cyber security, cyber terrorism, cyber warfare, and information warfare. For that reason, this paper first evaluates, compares, and contrasts seven cyber-security strategy reports covering the decade from 2002 to 2011. Secondly, armed with the strategic cyber-security reports of the last decade, the paper attempts to ascertain whether the near future cyber-security strategies will continue to be valid.

Cyberspace from the Hybrid Threat Perspective


Hybrid threats use conventional and unconventional means to achieve their goals. This paper explores the cyber threats as one possible aspect of hybrid threats. It describes three ways of approaching cyberspace (operations) from the hybrid threats perspective: supporting conventional operations, exploiting non-military systems, and exploring the opportunities provided by this environment. In particular, it highlights the aspects that are or likely will be relevant to the military community.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.















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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.


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