Volume 21, Issue 4


AOC Europe 2023 
15-17 May 2023


AOC Europe 2023 -  15-17 May 2023


Fall 2022

This is a hybrid edition of the Journal of Information Warfare (JIW) with a number of papers that are peer-reviewed that focus on misinformation and disinformation campaigns as well as a few special papers from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). We hope that you enjoy them. In addition, we are happy to announce that in 2023, in collaboration with the Information Professionals Association (IPA), that we will be starting a new academic publication entitled, The Journal of Cognitive Security (JGS). This effort will address the impact of the increasing volume and variability of information available to anyone with a handheld device, the speed with which information is replicated, spread, and processed to anyone with the means to access the Internet-protocol driven world, and the ubiquity of handheld telecommunications and the resulting interactions of those pressures on societal change. Cognitive Security is a field dedicated to understanding the role of influence amongst individuals and groups through application of multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder lenses.

Using Junk News to Build an Agenda for Violence: Russian Propaganda Targeting American Right-Wing Extremists


This article examines a known Russian propaganda website, News Room for American and European Based Citizens (NAEBC), run by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), that delivers propaganda through junk news. Using agenda-building theory, it seeks to determine if it can uncover the propagandists’ goals and motivations in order to examine its implications for information warfare. It finds that the IRA is using its extensive resources to agitate right-wing political extremists into violence. This calls into question whether the provocation of a civil war within the United States is a strategic information warfare goal of the Russian government. 

Information Warfare and Critical Infrastructure: The Combined Power of Information Warfare Threats


Critical Infrastructure (CI) is an area that has historically been rife with vulnerabilities, open to foreign and domestic threats. Recent events such as the Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods provider ransomware attacks highlight the need for better security and resiliency from cyber threats. However, within the Information Warfare (IW) constructs that have become increasingly refined by peer adversaries like China and Russia, the areas of Electromagnetic Warfare (EW), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Information Operations (IO) have become equally important to consider in the panoply of IW. This raises the important question regarding whether CI assets are adequately protected from the full complement of IW threats. Each IW area will be discussed from a threat perspective and examples will be presented to show how these threats can be combined to disrupt, deny, and destroy CI and CI assets with special attention given to peer and non-peer adversaries and the asymmetric advantages of each.

Employing Junk News to Drive a Propaganda Narrative


This study examines the testable question of whether junk news in the service of propaganda can form coherent narrative structure that can be analyzed and countered. The analysis was conducted using a known junk news site, USA Really, which is sponsored by the Russian Government, and which targets American citizens. Leveraging the Narrative Paradigm theory and ethnographic content analysis are the methods of research; an analysis of (N =150) were qualitatively analyzed. An unexpected finding that USA Really was constructing a conspiracy narrative targeting far right-wing extremists emerged. The study also identified a new type of narrative, not accounted for in narrative paradigm theory, that was meant to cause dissension rather than to serve as a guide for proper conduct.

Information Influence Operations: Application of National Instruments of Power


National Instruments of power are means for a nation to exert influence on other nations to achieve certain ends. This paper examines how Ukraine used its national instruments of power during the first months of the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 to conduct information influence operations. First, information influencing as a concept is described and then the framework of the paper is constructed by describing instruments of power and the basic elements of a strategy. This framework is then used to analyse how Ukraine used its instruments of power. Finally, this paper sums up the results with discussion and conclusions.

Planning Cyberspace Operations: Exercise Crossed Swords Case Study


Preparation of cyberspace operations (COs) requires planners to consider technical peculiarities, which are not relevant in terms of planning traditional military operations (Barber, Bobo & Sturm 2015). Using Exercise Crossed Swords 2021 as an experimental test bed, a review of the latest NATO doctrinal developments, structured interviews, and a questionnaire were undertaken. The literature review revealed thirteen specificities of COs, and the interview allowed for the identification of prerequisites for COs planning on strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The questionnaire highlighted four additional areas for improvement in CO planning. As a result of this investigation, twenty improvements to cyberspace operational planning are proposed.

Future of Information Influence Operations: Scifi as a Tool to Imagine the Unthinkable


The importance of information influence operations in international conflicts has increased. New technologies and tools like the Internet and social media have enabled influence operations to shift to new channels with a wider audience. But what will happen to information influence operations in the future? By using future studies’ methods like scenarios and science fiction, it is possible to try to imagine the various possibilities for information influence operations. This article presents a method for creating scifi stories based on scenarios to think about the future of information influence operations and their counteractions.

Supporting Automated Monitoring, Event Detection, and Response with Visualization and the MOSAICS JCTD Environment


The MOSAICS Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is poised to impact the way defenders protect IT/OT blended networks by demonstrating how currently available defense tools can be leveraged to automatically respond to potential incidents and provide insight into the structure and behavior of networks. By fusing the information from several customizable tools into a series of focused displays, the visualization component of the MOSAICS system supports defenders through automated monitoring, event detection, and response in a single platform.

Novel Approach to Asset Inventory of Facility-Related Control Systems through Augmented Reality


You cannot protect what you do not know you have. The first rule of cybersecurity is knowing what you have to better protect it. This paper presents an innovative remote inventory pilot for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) sites’ Facility-Related Control Systems that leverages low-cost hardware, video conferencing, and augmented reality to carry out an asset inventory as defined by USAR. Organisations should consider leveraging augmented reality when planning remote asset inventories.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Quick Links

View the latest issue of JIW.

Latest Edition

Purchase a subscription to JIW.
















Quill Logo

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.


Get in touch

Registered Agent and Mailing Address

  • Journal of Information Warfare
  •  ArmisteadTEC
  • Dr Leigh Armistead, President
  • 1624 Wakefield Drive
  • Virginia Beach, VA 23455