Stackelberg Game

Cyber Threat Screening Using a Queuing-Based Game-Theoretic Approach

Abstract:

Dynamic and uncertain security environments, such as cyber systems, often involve strategic interactions among multiple decision-making agents. In this paper, the authors consider a cybersecurity setting in which a system administrator (defender) has to screen malicious service requests from an attacker seeking to exhaust available cyber resources and inconvenience users with legitimate requests. This paper proposes a novel cyber-threat inspection model, based on Stackelberg games, that unifiesaspects of Threat Security Games with the Erlang-B queuing framework to provide equilibrium strategies for both the attacker and defender.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Keywords

C

C2
C2S
CDX
CIA
CIP
CPS

D

DNS
DoD
DoS

I

IA
ICS

S

SOA

X

XRY

Quill Logo

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

SUBSCRIBE NOW

Get in touch

  • Journal of Information Warfare
    114 Ballard Street
    Yorktown, VA
    23690
  • 757.871.3949
  • jiw@gbpts.com