Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

Supporting Automated Monitoring, Event Detection, and Response with Visualization and the MOSAICS JCTD Environment

Abstract:

The MOSAICS Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is poised to impact the way defenders protect IT/OT blended networks by demonstrating how currently available defense tools can be leveraged to automatically respond to potential incidents and provide insight into the structure and behavior of networks. By fusing the information from several customizable tools into a series of focused displays, the visualization component of the MOSAICS system supports defenders through automated monitoring, event detection, and response in a single platform.

Published In

Volume 21, Issue 4

A Context-Centred Research Approach to Phishing and Operational Technology in Industrial Control Systems

Abstract:

Advanced persistent threats that leverage phishing against OT are cyberattacks that endanger critical infrastructure assets nationwide. Today phishing, a human focused exploit, constitutes 91%  of successful attack vectors against federal assets. This means Human-Introduced Cyber Vulnerabilities (HICV) are the weakest cyber link. The success of these attacks also suggests HICV are neither well understood nor mitigated. To characterise HICV and provide the necessary context in which they exist, this paper introduces a research approach derived from the mature sci-ence of social ecology. The desired end result of this research is an HICV-focused risk assessment framework.

Published In

Volume 18, Issue 4

Cyber-Physical War Gaming

Abstract:

This  paper  presents  general  strategies  for  cyber  war  gaming  of  Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that are used for cyber security research at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL). 

Published In

Volume 16, Issue 3

Feasibility of a Cyber Attack on National Critical Infrastructure by a Non-State Violent Extremist Organization

ABSTRACT

This study describes the possibility of a Violent Extremist Organization’s (VEO’s) capacity to perform an attack upon national critical infrastructure and key assets causing “mass disruption” or “mass destruction”. Emphasis is placed upon Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in an effort to identify vulnerabilities that a non-state actor could utilize to conduct a cyberattack, including the energy sector’s architecture, potential vulnerabilities, and limitations. An emerging VEO’s ideology, capacity, cyber sophistication, and target type are evaluated. An analysis and discussion of an attack scenario’s results is followed by limitations, conclusions, and recommendations for future areas of study.

Published In

Volume 14, Issue 1

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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