Information Operations

The Persuasion Game: Serious Gaming Information Warfare and Influence

Abstract:

In an age of hybrid, asymmetric, and non-linear conflict, the role of Information Operations has become increasingly important. This paper presents a research project examining ways of better enabling stakeholders to respond to the increasing use of influence in warfare, in hybrid conflict, in competition, and in the realms of hard and soft politics. The project consisted of an international, cross-sector research group that drew on military, government, academic, and industry expertise in order to understand the best way to employ wargame influence. The use of wargaming as a training/research tool is familiar in military and civil contexts; the project discussed presents a truly innovative approach to influence studies, and shows the benefits of an interdisciplinary, cross-domain research team.

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part I

Abstract:

The following three articles examine three causal mechanisms prompting U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from conventional warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW): (1) the expansion of the information environment; (2) the globalisation, diffusion, and weaponisation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs); and (3) their acknowledgment that NCW provides a broader menu of indirect approaches not previously afforded through traditional CW. It cautions U.S. decision makers to recognise this shift and to counter it by establishing an interagency Information Warfare Directorate in the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC IWD should draft practical policies that result in the integration of the various aspects of domestic and foreign departments and agencies to cross-coordinate NCW activities. This will require remediating national policy and authority gaps as well as addressing any shortcomings in the budget allocation process.

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part II

Abstract: 

This article expands upon the previous article by examining the efficacy of Conventional Warfare (CW in a Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW environment. In particular, it attempts to characterise the relationship between globalisation and diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, in relation to its antifragility in NCW settings. More broadly, it argues that in an information-rich environment, characterised by advanced ICTs, adversaries now have the means to circumvent CW superiority and to influence policy asymmetrically. This article concludes that ICTs may align more appropriately with an NCW paradigm rather than the ostensible CW paradigm embraced by the West.

An Argument for Establishing a National Security Council Interagency Information Warfare Directorate - Part III

Abstract:

This concluding article briefly returns to the key themes identified in the first two articles in relation to the three causal mechanisms that prompted U.S. adversarial nation states to shift preference from Conventional Warfare (CW) to Non-Conventional Warfare (NCW). The article argues that by attaching an overt degree of salience to the integration of ICT in CW, analysts have overlooked its potential in NCW. 

A Cyber Counterintelligence Matrix for Outsmarting Your Adversaries

Abstract:

While Cyber CounterIntelligence (CCI) has been a distinctive specialisation field for state security structures internationally for well over a decade, recently there has been growing recognition of CCI’s significance to non-state actors. CCI is central to proactively mitigating cyber risk and exploiting opportunities. With the growing recognition of CCI’s significance comes an appreciation of its complexity. CCI is all about outthinking and outwitting adversaries. This article advances a conceptual matrix that can serve both as a high-level ‘pocket guide’ for outsmarting adversaries and as an aid to academic research.

How Do You Define a Poblem Like Influence

Abstract: 

While increasing media coverage is dedicated to how information is used to influencetarget audiences, a common terminology for describing these activities is lacking. This paper offers a literature review of terms currently used by industry, government, and media related to in-fluence  operations;  analyses  the  challenges posed by many of these definitions for use in practical policy development; and ultimately argues for a broader definition of such.

International Humanitarian Law and Cyber-Influence Operation

Abstract: 

Cyber-influenc and ‘fake news’ have become common terms due to high profle inci-dents such as alleged tampering in the 2016 US elections.

(Mis)Information Operations: An Integrated Perspective

Abstract: 

The massive diffusion of social media fosters disintermediation and changes the way users are informed, the way they process reality, and the way they engage in public debate. The cognitive layer of users and the related social dynamics define the nature and the dimension of informational threats. Users show the tendency to interact with information adhering to their preferred narrative and to ignore dissenting information. Confirmation bias seems to account for users’ decisions about consuming and spreading content; and, at the same time, aggregation of favored information within those communities reinforces group polarization.

Testing the Importance of Information Control: How Does Russia React When Pressured in the Information Environment?

Abstract:

Applying big data and sentiment analysis to TASS reporting and 15 years of Russian Foreign Ministry documents, this paper tests the importance Moscow places on information control. By comparing the Russian government’s responses to four categories of foreign policy tools— diplomatic, information, military, and economic (the DIME construct)—this research finds that Russia reacts far more negatively to information tools than to military, diplomatic, or economic tools. 

Israeli Defense Forces’ Information Operations 2006-2014 Part 1

Abstract:

This article series examines the evolution of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Information Op- eration (IO) activities during an eight-year timespan from 2006 to 2014. The case study shows a change in the Israeli Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series describes the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009. 

Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operations 2006-2014 Part 2

Abstract:

This article series examines the evolution of the Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operation activities during an eight-year timespan, from 2006 to 2014. To this end, the case study shows a change in the Israel Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories. The first part of the article series described the framework and methods of the study and two military operations conducted in 2006 and 2008-2009.

Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operations 2006-2014 Part 3

Abstract:

This article series examines the evolution of the Israel Defense Forces’ Information Operation activities during an eight-year timespan from 2006 to 2014. To this end, the case study shows a change in the Israel Defense Forces’ activities in the information domain. It also shows that, while battles can be easily won in the physical domain of the battlefield through superior firepower, the battles in the information domain are much more complicated and require much more diverse and complex means to achieve victories.

Social Media and Information Operations in the 21st Century

Abstract:

Modern military operations continue to be extraordinarily susceptible to the effects of cyber-based Information Operations (IO).  Within social media lies the ability to gain a clearer perspective of the 21st-century battlefields, enabling rapid and informed decision making and decisive action by commanders and their staffs. This paper discusses emerging trends, threats, and concepts that are being employed by numerous actors around the globe to gain positional advantage both internal and external to the cyberspace domain.

An Analysis of the Social-Media Technology, Tactics, and Narratives Used to Control Perception in the Propaganda War over Ukraine

Abstract:

Framed by the historic 2013-2015 conflict in Ukraine—widely described by Western media as a ‘Cold-War’-style clash between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO alliance—this qualitative case study examines how social media was used as a platform for propaganda warfare waged by clandestine bloggers and special operations commandos (known as trolls) deployed worldwide by state and non-state actors, and digitally linked and informed by data-mining, to manipulate public perceptions of the events by controlling an element of rhetoric known as narratives.

Information War and Rethinking Phase 0

Abstract:

In the Department of Defense, both military and civilian planners use a framework that divides military operations into six distinct phases. This type of framework may no longer have the utility it once enjoyed. This shift has less to do with technology changing the nature of war and more to do with how the United States differs from its adversaries in its understanding of war. Adversaries of the U.S. understand the state of the world to be one of conflict and competition and look to strategy to impose order through hierarchy. This article considers the Russian and Chinese approaches to the use of information in war and makes recommendations on how the U.S. might respond.

Qualifying the Information Sphere as a Domain

Abstract

Neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor NATO has an official definition of a domain, nor a set of criteria for what constitutes a domain. The authors propose a definition of a domain, define what constitutes a domain, posit how new domains are created over time, and describe six features or criteria for how to qualify what is and is not a domain. These definitions lead to our proposal that the ‘Information Sphere’ (which includes cyberspace) qualifies as a new domain, with features both similar to and different from the four existing physical domains.

Educating and Training Soldiers for Information Operations

Abstract

Military Training and Education is evolving because of the growing influence of Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare (IW).  This influence has grown from the tremendous changes in both technology and social issues. Traditional military training has dealt with key elements such as operational concepts of war, doctrine and law; leadership; combat skills; weapons skills; and operating effectively under stress.

Network Operations and Warfare: Employing Effective Paradigms across Different Environments

Abstract

Network Centric approaches feature strongly in the tactics of modern warfare. While the military have refined these paradigms into effective, applicable models, there is a scarcity of resources to assist enterprises employing these models in the commercial sphere. In the battle for information superiority, many competitive enterprises are struggling to adapt military models to achieve information superiority in a competitive business context.

Twitter as a Vector for Disinformation

Abstract

Twitter is a social network that represents a powerful information channel with the potential to be a useful vector for disinformation. This paper examines the structure of the Twitter social network and how this structure has facilitated the passing of disinformation both accidental and deliberate. Examples of the use of Twitter as an information channel are examined from recent events. The possible effects of Twitter disinformation on the information sphere are explored as well as the defensive responses users are developing to protect against tainted information.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Keywords

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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