Ukraine

Predicting the Success of Psychological Warfare (Part 2): Testing the Model in Two Case Studies

Abstract:

The previous study (See Part 1), attempted to identify the conditions for the success or failure of psychological warfare, based on a systematic scan of the literature and sources in the fields of military history, strategy, psychology, and communication science. This scan resulted in eight predictors, ranging from the need for military victories to the targeted use of violence, from control of the information space to credibility. In the second part of this study, to illustrate the implementation of these conditions in a real military operation, the eight conditions are used to assess the performance of Russian online psychological operations against Ukraine and the Hamas online psychological campaign against Israel. The eight conditions model provides a good explanation of the differences in these two campaigns’ effectiveness.

Politics by Other Memes: Ukrainian Memetic Warfare after the Russian Full-Scale Invasion

Abstract:

This article explores Ukraine’s use of memes as a tool of operations in the information environment (OIEs) during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Employed by a decentralized, civic-driven network, Ukrainian memes boosted morale, countered Russian propaganda, and shaped international narratives. Divided into categories of popularization of Ukrainian heroism, mockery of Russians, and self-reflective irony, these memes exemplify the strategic utility of memetic warfare. Despite challenges in control and predictability, their viral success underscores their efficiency as an OIE tool. The Ukrainian case highlights the growing importance of memes in modern conflicts and calls for integrating memetic warfare into broader information operations strategies.

Cyber Mobilisation 2.0: Capitalisation and Instigation of Hacktivists and Vigilantes in Future Conflicts

Abstract:

Participation in contemporary cyber warfare can be as simple as playing a game or just allowing your computer to perform Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In the future, hacktivists and vigilantes could potentially act as an outsourced cyber force that is dispersed around the world in a constant state of readiness. In this article the authors discuss how nation states might capitalise and instigate hacktivists and vigilantes in future conflicts. Firstly, the authors revisit the concepts of ‘hacktivism’, ‘vigilantism’, and ‘cyber proxy’, and aim to define the novel concept of ‘cyber mobilisation’. Secondly, the role of hacktivists and vigilantes in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is explained and the cyber mobilisation practices of both countries are described. Thirdly, the authors discuss how hacktivists and vigilantes justify their behaviour to themselves. Fourthly, the authors explore the elements and techniques of potential future cyber mobilisation. And finally, the risks and challenges related to worldwide cyber mobilisation and the individual participation in global cyber warfare are discussed.

The Geopolitics of Disinformation in a Continued Cold War: A Study of Russia’s Cyber Information Operations Strategy (2022-2023)

Abstract:

This study seeks to explore patterns in Russia’s disinformation operations strategy during the war in Ukraine and discuss them in the context of its geopolitical interests across the world. The data for this research spans from the beginning of the invasion in February 2022 to July 2023 and is collected from the EUvsDisinfo database in the form of articles where disinformation was discovered (N=1906).

Cyber Warfare and War in Ukraine

Abstract:

Today cyberspace is a one military domain. The new cyber capacities of armed forces create new possibilities to achieve the goals of war. These new and advanced cyber capabilities are a part of the new non-kinetic environment where cyber operations are used in combination with information warfare (IW) and electronic warfare (EW). These non-kinetic operations are used with lethal weapons systems to produce an operational advantage. This article is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict. The article reviews the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for effective cyber defence.

The Impact of Russian Cyber Attackers within the Ukraine Situation

Abstract:

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest war in Europe since World War II. The aim of the paper is to look at how politically motivated hacking by Russia has been used as part of the Ukraine situation with a focus on the different attack types since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The paper will focus on the different groups acting on behalf of Russia, their actions, and techniques. The paper will discuss what their actions mean for the future of cyber conflicts.

An Analysis of the Social-Media Technology, Tactics, and Narratives Used to Control Perception in the Propaganda War over Ukraine

Abstract:

Framed by the historic 2013-2015 conflict in Ukraine—widely described by Western media as a ‘Cold-War’-style clash between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO alliance—this qualitative case study examines how social media was used as a platform for propaganda warfare waged by clandestine bloggers and special operations commandos (known as trolls) deployed worldwide by state and non-state actors, and digitally linked and informed by data-mining, to manipulate public perceptions of the events by controlling an element of rhetoric known as narratives.

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

Keywords

A

AI
APT

C

C2
C2S
CDX
CIA
CIP
CPS

D

DNS
DoD
DoS

I

IA
ICS

M

P

PDA

S

SOA

X

XRY

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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