Military Deception

An Inflection Point for the Army’s Information Operations Officers

 

Abstract:

The U.S. Army’s information operations (IO) community stands at a critical strategic crossroad that will shape its trajectory over the coming decade. With the release of Army Doctrine Publication 3-13, Information, the Army risks repeating a long-standing doctrinal error by continuing to define IO officers primarily as “synchronizers” and “integrators” of information capabilities and organizations in support of lethal operations. This narrow framing marginalizes the broader non-lethal potential of IO in joint and combined environments. The paper argues that IO practitioners should instead be conceptualized primarily as deception officers, central to the conduct of influence and information warfare.

Published In

Volume 24, Issue 4

Written By

Peter Wilcox

Military Deception in Focus: A Quantitative Reassessment

Abstract:

Deception has long been regarded as a potent yet paradoxical tool in warfare, historically yielding strategic advantages while often being underappreciated. This study examines the frequency of deception in military operations using a random sample of 40 historical battles. Findings reveal that deception is employed in 30-53% of military operations, challenging prior estimates of over 80%. By clarifying deception’s prevalence, this research offers new insights to enhance military strategies and to refine the integration of deception into contemporary operations.

Published In

Volume 24, Issue 3

Written By

James Skeffington

Military Deception and Strategic Culture: The Soviet Union and Russian Federation

Abstract:

Strategic culture shapes political-military organizational activity through a process of socialization, yet little is known about strategic culture’s impact on information operations. This paper explores the influence of Russian-Soviet strategic culture on military deception operations during World War II, the Soviet Afghan War, and the conflict in Ukraine. It finds that the hierarchical characteristic of Russian-Soviet strategic culture contributes to the centralization of deception operations. This work shows that, in the context of foreign policy toward Russia, not only does one need to consider technological innovations for traditional military use, but also advances below the threshold of declared war.

Published In

Volume 20, Issue 3

Caesar’s Military Deception at the Sambre River (57BC)

ABSTRACT

Notable historians believe the Nervii surprised Julius Caesar at the River(57 BC) in Belgica because Caesar had not taken precautionary defensive measures such as guarding the construction with an armed legion.  However, an examination of Caesar’s description opens the possibility that he baited the Nervii into attacking before their allies, the Aduatuci, could join them.  Further supporting this alternative theory are Caesar’s account of these events which  align with the six modern principles of military deception – focus, objective, centralized planning and control, security, timeliness, and integration.

Published In

Volume 7, Issue 1

Written By

Milton Diaz

Journal of Information Warfare

The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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The definitive publication for the best and latest research and analysis on information warfare, information operations, and cyber crime. Available in traditional hard copy or online.

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Registered Agent and Mailing Address

  • Journal of Information Warfare
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  • Virginia Beach, VA 23455

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