Summer 2025

Welcome to the Summer 2025 edition of the Journal of Information Warfare (JIW). I write this editorial from Kaiserslautern, Germany where the 24th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS) is occurring. This conference and the sister event, specifically the International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS), run by Academic Conferences International Limited, www.academic-conferences.org, are great events to help researchers get published as well as to meet fellow colleagues who are researching similar topics. Shown below are the locations for these future conferences, with the call for papers for ICCWS ’26 already on the street.

Abstract:

The question of what makes psychological warfare successful has never been addressed in a methodological, systematic, and clear manner in the existing PSYWAR literature. To identify these conditions, this study scanned the key works on psychological warfare, backed by sources in the fields of military history, strategy, psychology, and communication science. The conditions presented in this study are eight in total, ranging from the need for military victories to the targeted use of violence, from control of the information space to credibility. In the second part of this study, to illustrate the implementation of these conditions in a real military operation, the eight conditions are used to assess the performance of Russian online psychological operations against Ukraine and the Hamas online psychological campaign against Israel. Findings reveal how the model’s eight conditions explain the success/failure of these two psychological campaigns.

Abstract:

The previous study (See Part 1), attempted to identify the conditions for the success or failure of psychological warfare, based on a systematic scan of the literature and sources in the fields of military history, strategy, psychology, and communication science. This scan resulted in eight predictors, ranging from the need for military victories to the targeted use of violence, from control of the information space to credibility. In the second part of this study, to illustrate the implementation of these conditions in a real military operation, the eight conditions are used to assess the performance of Russian online psychological operations against Ukraine and the Hamas online psychological campaign against Israel. The eight conditions model provides a good explanation of the differences in these two campaigns’ effectiveness.

Abstract:

This study examines algorithmic patterns in Harris County, Texas (U.S.) voter registration data, revealing a sophisticated base-8 modular algorithm controlling ID assignment for 2.3 million voters. Analysis of 18 million state records shows this algorithm employs bifurcated distribution patterns that deviate from standard practices and mirror patterns identified in Ohio. Comparative analysis with Tarrant County confirms Harris County’s patterns represent deliberate implementation rather than natural database behavior. The algorithm enables covert record attribution while providing no legitimate benefits in public databases. These findings raise concerns under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993’s transparency requirements and meet SEC materiality standards, affecting more than 5% of records with engineered modifications that would alter integrity assessments. This research shows how information warfare may target democratic institutions through seemingly benign database management practices.

Abstract:

Deception has long been regarded as a potent yet paradoxical tool in warfare, historically yielding strategic advantages while often being underappreciated. This study examines the frequency of deception in military operations using a random sample of 40 historical battles. Findings reveal that deception is employed in 30-53% of military operations, challenging prior estimates of over 80%. By clarifying deception’s prevalence, this research offers new insights to enhance military strategies and to refine the integration of deception into contemporary operations.

Abstract:

This article explores Ukraine’s use of memes as a tool of operations in the information environment (OIEs) during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Employed by a decentralized, civic-driven network, Ukrainian memes boosted morale, countered Russian propaganda, and shaped international narratives. Divided into categories of popularization of Ukrainian heroism, mockery of Russians, and self-reflective irony, these memes exemplify the strategic utility of memetic warfare. Despite challenges in control and predictability, their viral success underscores their efficiency as an OIE tool. The Ukrainian case highlights the growing importance of memes in modern conflicts and calls for integrating memetic warfare into broader information operations strategies.

Abstract:

This paper introduces a novel approach to Strategic Communication (Strat Com) by integrating Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) principles, aiming to achieve sustained behavioural change within target audiences. By applying the MO-ABC framework, the study systematically designs influence operations and evaluates their impact on behaviour in case studies, including Ukraine’s communication and mobilisation campaign and the British Army’s recruitment effort. The findings demonstrate that effective StratCom requires not only persuasive messaging but also the design of environmental contingencies that reinforce target behaviours. This approach offers a robust framework for future influence operations in complex information environments.

Abstract:

As hybrid actors increasingly exploit misinformation for tactical purposes, responding effectively to informational attacks has become a critical challenge. Determining the optimal timing for such responses presents a dilemma: reacting too early may inadvertently amplify the attack, while responding too late risks ceding strategic initiative to the adversary.

To address this issue, the cognitive biases at stake in decision making in these contexts is analysed. A novel game-theoretical model to conceptualise the problem of response timing is then introduced. This model is applied to two case studies, from which practical insights for the implementation of an active informational defence strategy are drawn.

Abstract:

This analysis investigates whether Wisconsin’s voter registration database exhibits structural vulnerabilities or evidence of exploitation. Findings reveal three significant deviations from standard practice: systematic duplication of voter identifiers affecting over 874,000 records; mathematically precise interlaced ID patterns with statistically impossible distributions; and dual ID systems where one functions as a hidden identifier. Documentation shows these vulnerabilities have been exploited, with 141 confirmed cases of duplicate voting in the analysed subset. These characteristics suggest deliberate implementation rather than accidental error, enabling covert record classification and compromised election integrity consistent with non-kinetic information warfare methods.