Abstract:

This study analyzes AI-generated propaganda videos produced by Chinese state-affiliated actors to examine how meaning is constructed through multimodal design. Using a social semiotic framework and multimodal qualitative content analysis, the research explores how visual, textual, and auditory modes interact to encode ideological messages. Findings reveal that these videos deploy strategic combinations of symbolic imagery, ambient sound design, and compositional framing to represent American institutions as morally bankrupt, militaristic, or culturally hollow. Rather than relying on explicit argumentation, the propaganda achieves persuasion through emotional tone, irony, and mythic symbolism—inviting viewers to adopt a critical or oppositional stance toward the United States. This aestheticized approach reflects a shift in Chinese cognitive warfare: from declarative messaging to immersive perception management. The study contributes to propaganda theory by mapping how intermodal coherence functions as rhetorical strategy and offers practical implications for information warfare professionals confronting an increasingly ambient and algorithmically distributed threat environment.

Abstract:

Cognitive Warfare leverages advances in science and technology to influence how populations think and behave. There is currently no unified framework for conceptualizing its goals and methods. This paper introduces the Unplug, Corrupt, disOrganize, Diagnose, Enhance (UnCODE) system to classify Cognitive Warfare strategies. UnCODE is neurocentric, focusing on how adversarial actions affect neural information processing in individuals, algorithms, or societies. It defines five goal categories and divides methods into direct and indirect neural access. Being domain- and species-agnostic, UnCODE enables interdisciplinary understanding of attack strategies and serves as a unifying framework for analysing Cognitive Warfare across contexts.

Abstract:

As hybrid actors increasingly exploit misinformation for tactical purposes, responding effectively to informational attacks has become a critical challenge. Determining the optimal timing for such responses presents a dilemma: reacting too early may inadvertently amplify the attack, while responding too late risks ceding strategic initiative to the adversary.

To address this issue, the cognitive biases at stake in decision making in these contexts is analysed. A novel game-theoretical model to conceptualise the problem of response timing is then introduced. This model is applied to two case studies, from which practical insights for the implementation of an active informational defence strategy are drawn.

Abstract:

Cognitive security, an emerging field, spans disciplines and contexts but often lacks clear definitions. In the digital age, where disinformation spreads rapidly via the Internet, cognitive security is particularly crucial. Drawing on theoretical background, a definition is proposed: comprehensive cognitive security can be defined as a state and a process in which undesired malign influence or manipulation is incapable of altering human cognition and which can be achieved through a combination of knowledge and situation awareness with purposeful actions. This definition provides a framework that can be applied across various disciplines and can support societies in educating citizens on cognitive security.

Abstract:

With the development of science and technology, warfare has become a multi-domain operation that includes land, sea, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic waves, and human cognition. Nonetheless, existing research has not examined the relationship between each of these domains and the cognitive domain. Hence, this paper explores how cognitive influence on adversaries can be exerted from multiple domains. This paper analyses the case of the war in Ukraine in which the latest science and technology were used. This article finds that attacks on human cognition are exerted from all domains and provides a comprehensive model of cognitive influence on the adversary.

Abstract:

Defense and civilian planners have struggled to place disinformation as a discrete weapon in the cognitive domain. This is so because disinformation is inadequately and ambiguously defined for military and civilian components. When comparing the cognitive terrain to other forms of geography, it becomes evident why it is contested and relevant to national security. This paper analyzes the reasons for the ambiguity and explains why national security professionals must develop a framework to identify disinformation. Because disinformation is an element of cognitive warfare, it can be defined using a set of three criteria. The criteria fix disinformation in the cognitive domain enabling the warfighter and homeland defenders to counter and use it effectively.