Summer 2026

The maritime domain has long been understood as a pillar of global commerce and an arena of geopolitical competition. It is now also a contested cyber-physical environment. In this environment, the manipulation of digital systems carries consequences that may extend far beyond any single vessel, port, or network. This special issue of The Journal of Information Warfare assembles seven contributions that collectively advance the understanding of the maritime domain by discussing conflicts, governance challenges, emerging threats, and defensive capabilities.

This issue was developed in close connection with the Maritime Cybersecurity Applied Research, Technology and Education Center (MCARTEC) at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. UNCW MCARTEC is a nationally visible research hub focused on one of the most important and least mature domains of critical infrastructure. Since its establishment, MCARTEC has built research capacity around the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) as a complex cyber-physical ecosystem. MCARTEC’s signature achievement is the MTS Cybersecurity Technology Roadmap. UNCW faculty coordinated 38 international experts across 26 organizations to define 44 priority R&D areas and 153 key research questions in maritime cybersecurity. The Technology Roadmap has established a structured national research agenda for the field.

Abstract:

Cyber operations targeting maritime infrastructure are commonly framed as technical disruptions designed to inflict physical or economic harm. This paper argues that many such incidents function instead as strategic signalling. The maritime domain’s mixed civilian-commercial structure and fragmented governance make it especially conducive to grey-zone and hybrid warfare, where strategic signalling plays a prominent role. Recognizing maritime cyber activity as strategic communication is essential for calibrated responses and escalation management. Examining cases of maritime cyber disruption from 2021 to 2025, this paper identifies patterns of amplified narratives, increasing use of AIS (Automatic Identification System) and GNSS (Global Navigational Satellite System) manipulation, and evidence of preparation for future contingencies.

Abstract:

In the last 10 years, publicly reported cyberattacks in the maritime sector have increased by more than 1000%, going from 4 in 2015 to 92 attacks in 2023, 80 in 2024, and 51 in 2025. Having said that, vessels themselves are less than 21% of those attacks. In addition, many of those cyber incidents relate to attacks on navigation and not actual compromises of the vessel systems themselves. Some researchers and industry insiders argue the threat to vessels is overblown, but is it? Using public incident data related to vessel and non-vessel cyberattacks, information on the capability and motivations of state and non-state cyber threat actors, the authors argue that cyberattacks on vessels remain a legitimate area of concern, and expectations that there should be large numbers of documented incidents to validate that position are unrealistic. The authors do, however, acknowledge the necessity to continually contest such assumptions given the limited data available.

Abstract:

Zero-Trust Architecture (ZTA) has emerged as a foundational cybersecurity paradigm with wide adoption. However, assumptions made in shore-based enterprise networks pose challenges when applying zero-trust principles in maritime environments. In maritime systems, operations depend on intermittent, low-bandwidth, and often contested communications. Thus, strict zero trust enforcement can unintentionally disrupt mission-critical functions. This paper examines the benefits and limitations of applying ZTA in maritime contexts, with particular attention to safety-critical operations and military. This work outlines a maritime-adapted zero trust framework that integrates degraded-mode operation and fallback mechanisms to preserve operational continuity while maintaining security objectives and safe mission completion.

Abstract:

This article builds on the extant literature on undersea cables and information warfare by offering an analytic pathway to explore the operational limitations and strategic logic of attacks on undersea cables. While China possesses a host of capabilities that could be used to support an undersea sabotage campaign, there are also several technical, geographic, and strategic factors constraining its actions. China’s information warfare doctrine demands that its forces seek to obtain information dominance, but cutting cables will degrade both Taiwan’s and the PLA’s ability to operate within the information sphere. In short, cable sabotage cuts both ways.

Abstract:

Despite growing concern about cognitive warfare targeting critical infrastructure, maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations have received little systematic attention as potential targets, despite being life-saving activities, constantly happening around the globe, and involving efforts from both militaries, coast guards, and NGOs. This paper presents a disruption model based on the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual—employing Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop phases as analytical lenses—for understanding how AI-generated deception threatens maritime SAR effectiveness.

Abstract:

As AI-enabled adversaries gain increasing capability to conduct gray-zone cyber operations, maritime cybersecurity is evolving into a contest for operational control, feedback integrity, and decision advantage across the U.S. Maritime Transportation System (MTS). Using a Design Science Research methodology, this study develops and evaluates the Maritime Transportation System–Functional Contested Control Framework (MTS-FCCF), extending the MTS-FCMM by integrating governance controls, cyber mission threads, and adversarial interaction into a unified STPA-SEC analytical structure. Scenario-based validation demonstrated improved identification of unsafe control actions, process-model mismatch, feedback deficiencies, and adversarial disruption pathways compared to conventional static cybersecurity approaches.

Abstract:

Maritime Transportation Systems are considered critical infrastructure and systemic risk which can trigger cascade effects to impacting operations, the economy, and national security. Maritime cybersecurity systems currently face challenges, and a lack of structured frameworks to prioritize R&D investments and technological development. This study aims to systematically analyze maritime cybersecurity using a Technology Roadmapping (TRM) approach structured around the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), integrating a qualitative analysis of themes from the perspectives of people, technology, and governance across six functional areas. TRM facilitates the identification of drivers, capability gaps, technologies, and R&D priorities, to address these limitations. The findings highlight that maritime cybersecurity should be treated as a system-of-systems problem that requires the integration of IT, OT, and cyber-physical systems, as well as automation and real-time capabilities supported by human-Artificial Intelligence (AI) collaboration.

Scope of the Special Issue

This invited special issue presents a curated set of authoritative contributions addressing cybersecurity risks, resilience, and strategic dynamics across the maritime domain. The scope encompasses cyber-physical systems and digitally enabled operations within the Maritime Transportation System (MTS), including vessels, ports, terminals, offshore infrastructure, and interconnected logistics and supply chains.

The issue focuses on three tightly integrated dimensions:

• Operational Cybersecurity: Threats, vulnerabilities, and defensive practices affecting shipboard systems, port operations, navigation technologies, and maritime OT/IT convergence.
• Governance and Policy: Regulatory frameworks, standards development, risk governance models, and institutional coordination across national and international maritime stakeholders.
• Strategic and Emerging Risks: Grey-zone conflict, information warfare, AI-enabled threats, and geopolitical dimensions of maritime cyber infrastructure.

Contributions collectively emphasize decision relevance, linking technical insights to implications for policymakers, regulators, and senior operational leaders. The issue prioritizes work that advances system-level understanding, rather than isolated technical vulnerabilities, and highlights cross-cutting challenges spanning people, process, and technology.